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ABSTRACT
The purpose for the present study was to examine working memory for what, where, and
when information in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and adult humans using a computerized
task. In Experiment 1, monkeys and humans completed three delayed matching-to-sample
(DMTS) tasks: 1) identity DMTS, 2) spatial DMTS, and 3) temporal DMTS. In Experiments 2,
the identity and spatial tasks were combined so that monkeys had to report both what and where
information about an event. In Experiment 3, the identity, spatial, and temporal tasks were
combined in order to examine what-where-when memory integration. In Experiment 4, monkeys
and humans were presented with two sequential events, and a memory cue indicated which event
they were required to report. The rhesus monkeys and human participants were able to report all
three components of the events and there was some evidence suggesting that these components
were integrated in memory for the rhesus monkeys.
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Memory for “What”, “Where”, and “When” Information by
Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and Adult Humans

INTRODUCTION
In a natural environment, many species, including nonhuman primates must remember
multiple types of information, including memory for where particular foods are located in space
and memory for temporal information concerning their previous foraging experiences, in order to
keep track of available food sources. In the comparative literature, there are numerous
impressive examples of working memory and long-term semantic memory in a variety of
nonhuman species, including nonhuman primates (Beran, 2004; Beran, Pate, & Richardson,
2000; Washburn & Astur, 1998). However, few studies have explicitly examined memory for
multiple components of a single past event in nonhuman primate species. In the human
literature, the ability to remember multiple components of a personally experienced event is
referred to as episodic memory and has been argued to be unique to humans and absent in other
species including our closest living relatives, the nonhuman primates (Tulving, 1972, 1993,
2005). However, in recent years there has been increased research devoted to examining
memory in nonhuman species for episodes or events (see Terrace and Metcalfe, 2005 for a
review).
In contrast to other forms of memory such as working memory or long-term semantic
memory, episodic memory refers to memory for a unique event from one’s past in which
multiple components of the event (i.e.., what, where, and when the event took place) are bound
together and integrated in long-term memory (Tulving, 1972, 1993). Furthermore, for humans
the retrieval of episodic memory is accompanied by an awareness of one’s past and a subjective
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conscious experience, in which the owner of an episodic memory feels as if he or she is mentally
traveling back to the time and place where the event occurred. In contrast to semantic memory,
which refers to memory for general information about the world (i.e., knowing factual
information about events that you directly experienced or learned about through another source),
episodic memory refers to memory for a specific past event in which spatial and temporal
information concerning the event are bound together in memory. The episodic-semantic
memory distinction has been described as remembering (i.e., recalling the event when the
information was acquired) versus simply knowing information without any explicit recall of the
event when the information was acquired (Roediger & McDermott, 2000).
The definition of episodic memory contains relatively objective behavioral elements,
including the binding of several types of information in memory that can be studied in nonhuman
species. However, the definition of episodic memory also contains relatively vague subjective
conscious qualities that cannot be assessed in nonhuman species. It is impossible to assess the
phenomenological quality of episodic retrieval in animals as they are unable to describe their
mental states verbally. It is presumably the subjective quality of retrieval that has caused
comparative psychologists to avoid discussion of episodic memory in nonhuman animals, as
nonverbal species are unable to describe their internal mental experiences to human
experimenters. However, the assumption that language is necessary to study long-term memory
for past events has recently been challenged both by studies with nonhuman species that have
employed behavioral definitions of episodic-like memory (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998, 1999;
Clayton, Yu, & Dickinson, 2001; de Kort, Dickinson, & Clayton, 2005; Hampton, Hampstead, &
Murray, 2005; C. Menzel, 1999, 2005; Schwartz, Colon, Sanchez, Rodriquez, & Evans, 2002;
Schwartz, Hoffman, & Evans, 2005; Schwartz, Meissner, Hoffman, Evans, & Frazier, 2004;
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Zentall, Clement, Bhatt, & Allen, 2001) and by studies with human infants who are in the early
stages of language acquisition and are not yet able to verbalize their experiences to the same
extent as human adults (Bauer, 2002; Bauer, Hertsgaard, & Dow, 1994; Bauer, Wiebe, Carver,
Waters, & Nelson, 2003). In the studies with nonhuman species, the term episodic-like memory
has been used to differentiate this behavioral definition of episodic memory that includes
memory for a trial-unique event, the integration of what, where, and when information in
memory, and retrieval from long-term memory, from the general definition of episodic memory
used in the human literature.
Why Predict Similar Memory Processes in Nonhuman Species?
There is evidence that some of the brain regions implicated in the retrieval of episodic
memory in humans also are essential in integrating spatial and temporal information in animals.
The hippocampus, which has been implicated in episodic memory retrieval for both remote and
recent past events in humans (Rekkas & Constable, 2005) appears to serve a related function in
binding spatial and temporal memory in some food-caching and foraging species. Nonhuman
animals with damage to the hippocampus demonstrate deficits in integrating what, where, and
when information in memory (Colombo & Broadbent, 2000; Eichenbaum & Fortin, 2003;
Ergorul & Eichenbaum, 2004). In addition to this similarity of function, the neural structure of
the hippocampus has been found to be relatively similar across species (Morris, 2002).
Therefore, it would seem reasonable to predict on the basis of these structural and functional
similarities that humans and nonhuman species may share similar underlying mechanisms for
integrating what, where, and when information about past episodes in memory. The ability to
integrate multiple components of past events in memory, although not sufficient for episodic
memory, does appear to be one of the prerequisites for episodic memory in humans. Therefore,
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in beginning to investigate whether nonhuman species have the ability to recall specific past
episodes, it is necessary to understand how humans and nonhuman species integrate information
about what occurred, where the event occurred, and when it took place relative to other points in
time.
Separate Studies of What, Where, and When in Nonhuman Primates
In recent years there has been an increased interest in whether animals integrate temporal
and spatial information from novel events in memory in the form of episodic-like memory, but in
the past these forms of memory (spatial memory, temporal memory, and object memory) have
often been investigated through separate lines of research.
Spatial Memory

There have been an extensive number of field and laboratory studies

investigating spatial memory in nonhuman species, including nonhuman primates. Some of
these investigations were conducted using delayed-response tasks that have been modeled after
the foraging ecology of the species under investigation. In delayed-response tasks an animal
learns that an item has been hidden in one of several locations (either by caching the item
themselves, finding it in a foraging task, or by watching as an experimenter hides the food item),
and after some period of delay the individual is then allowed to search for the hidden item.
These studies have demonstrated that a variety of nonhuman primates, including monkey and
great ape species, retain information about where food sources are located in a complex
environment after both short-term and long-term memory retention intervals (Gibeault &
MacDonald, 2000; Hunter, 1913; Kohler & Winter, 1925; Lacreuse et al., 2005; MacDonald,
1994; MacDonald & Agnes, 1999; MacDonald, Pang, & Gibeault, 1994; E. W. Menzel, 1973;
Tinklepaugh, 1932; Yerkes & Yerkes, 1928).
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Object Memory There also have been a number of studies examining whether animals
remember information about specific objects they have recently encountered. In these tasks,
working memory has been assessed using delayed matching-to-sample tasks (DMTS) in which
an animal is presented with a particular stimulus and then, after a brief delay, the animal is
presented with a discrimination task in which several choices are present and the animal must
select the stimulus that was presented as the sample. In these laboratory studies, a variety of
species have demonstrated memory for what they had experienced by selecting the previously
seen stimulus at levels that are above what would be expected by chance (Colombo, Swain,
Harper, & Alsop, 1997; Roitblat, Penner, & Nachtigall, 1990; Tavares & Tomaz, 2002;
Washburn, Hopkins, & Rumbaugh, 1989).
Temporal Memory

There is also some evidence that suggests that nonhuman species

are able to retain some temporal information concerning past events. Memory for temporal
information has been assessed by constructing a simulated foraging task, in which animals were
given the opportunity to consume a particular food source at one of several locations, and then
were reintroduced to the environment after either a short retention interval or a long retention
interval.

The food at the previously visited location remained depleted when the individuals

were returned after a short retention interval, but the food source at the same location was
replenished after a long retention interval. In order to demonstrate memory for temporal
information about food sources in the environment, an animal would need to discriminate
between the two retention intervals by returning to the previously visited food site only after long
retention intervals (referred to as a win-stay strategy). However, when returned after a short
retention interval, the animal should choose to select another location (referred to as a win-shift
strategy). In one study, a species of nectar feeding bird (Xanthomyza phrygia) adopted a win-
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shift strategy when reintroduced into the environment after a short retention interval (10 min),
but adopted a win-stay strategy when reintroduced into the environment after a long retention
interval (3 h; Burke & Fulham, 2003). However, this paradigm has limitations for examining
temporal memory, as some species demonstrate biases in using these foraging strategies based on
their natural foraging ecology. For example, some species have a diet that is primarily composed
of foods that replenish fairly quickly, whereas other species have a diet that is composed of foods
that take a long time to replenish (Burke, Cieplucha, Cass, Russell, & Fry, 2002; Platt, Brannon,
Briese, & French, 1996). There also have been studies that have examined whether pigeons can
discriminate different retention intervals using a discrimination task in which the animal was
required to make one response (or in some cases inhibit responding) if the retention interval was
of a particular length, and to make another response if the retention interval was a different
length (Zentall, Weaver, & Clement, 2004). The temporal discriminations in these studies were
between relatively short time periods (2 s vs. 8 s and 8 s vs. 16 s). The results from these studies
suggest that pigeons are able to discriminate between several short temporal periods.
Experiments Examining Memory for Multiple Components of Events
Indirect Evidence for Integration of Multiple Components. There has been some indirect
evidence for the integration of what and where memory in early studies of spatial memory in
great apes (Menzel, 1973; Tinklepaugh, 1932). Tinklepaugh (1932) demonstrated that
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) remembered multiple locations of hidden food items after
relatively long delay intervals and noted that they reacted with “surprise” when a preferred food
item had been surreptitiously replaced with a less desirable food item while the chimpanzees
were absent during the delay, suggesting that the chimpanzees retained some memory for what
information in addition to where information. In another study, E. Menzel (1973) found that
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when chimpanzees searched for food items they had seen hidden in an outdoor environment,
they recovered highly preferred foods (fruits) before recovering less desirable foods (vegetables),
suggesting that they had some knowledge about what was hidden where.
What-Where-When Memory: The Food-Caching Paradigm. In the food-caching
paradigm, developed by Clayton and Dickinson (1998, 2001), scrub jays (Aphelocoma
coerulescens) were given the opportunity to cache perishable and nonperishable food items (e.g.,
mealworms and peanuts) in specific locations in sand-filled ice cube trays. The scrub jays were
removed from the caching environment and returned to recover their caches after relatively long
retention intervals (1 h - 24 h). Although the scrub jays had a preference for the highly
perishable food (e.g., mealworms) those foods degraded after short retention intervals (1 h)
whereas the less desirable food (e.g., peanuts) remained fresh after the long retention intervals
(24 h). The scrub jays searched where they had cached the highly perishable food items after
short retention intervals, but switched to searching locations containing less perishable foods if
they were returned to the caching environment after long retention intervals.
These results indicate that the scrub jays integrated memory for what and where food
items were located with memory for how much time had elapsed between their initial visit and
the time when they were allowed to search. It is possible that the jays were able to accomplish
this task by using familiarity cues and memory trace strength at retrieval, for example, by simply
adopting the rule to search for preferred food items (that decay quickly) if the food sites were
familiar or if the memory trace was vivid. However, scrub-jays maintained their high level of
accuracy for novel variations in which the use of memory trace strength cues would lead to
significantly reduced performance (de Kort, Dickinson, & Clayton, 2005).
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Hampton et al. (2005) adapted the food-caching paradigm for use with rhesus macaques
(Macaca mulatta). The subjects included both normal individuals and monkeys who had
experienced damage to the hippocampus. The monkeys learned an arbitrary rule that a preferred
food item was still fresh after a 1-hour delay, but it decayed after a 25-hour delay. If macaques
retained information about what food was hidden, where it was hidden, and how much time had
passed since it was hidden, one would expect them to search in the highly preferred food site
after 1-hour delays, but switch to selecting the less preferred, but more stable food item after 25hour delays. Both groups of macaques demonstrated memory for what and where, but not
memory for when, as they continued to search for the preferred food after 25-hour delays. It is
unclear why the monkeys were unable to retain information about how much time had passed
since the last foraging episode. It is possible that monkeys were not able to retain when
information in memory, but it is also possible that this task was not well suited to investigating
the integration of what, where, and when memory in nonhuman primates. The task was modeled
after a species-specific food-caching task, which may not be the best paradigm for testing
laboratory animals that do not have any experience in foraging. Indeed, there have been other
tasks designed to investigate episodic memory in nonhuman primates, as well as other species,
that are quite different from the food-caching paradigm.
Unanticipated Memory Tests for Recently Performed Events. Zentall et al. (2001)
examined episodic-like memory in pigeons (Columbia livia) by training pigeons to “comment”
behaviorally on whether they had recently performed an action. The pigeons were trained to
peck when presented with one type of color stimulus (e.g., blue), but not to peck when presented
with another color stimulus (e.g., green). In a separate phase of training, the pigeons were
trained to press one particular color (e.g., yellow) if they had recently pecked and to press
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another color (e.g., red) if they had not recently pecked. These components were combined in
unexpected tests in which the pigeons were instructed to peck or not to peck (e.g., blue or green),
but after a short retention interval they were unexpectedly asked about whether they had recently
performed the pecking behavior (i.e., they were given a choice between yellow or red).
Although these studies do not address the binding of what, where, and when information in
memory, the “surprise” element of these memory tests captures an essential feature of episodic
memory, as these unexpected tests reduce the possibility that the pigeons were rehearsing the
information in semantic memory in anticipation of being tested about that memory.
Mercado, Uyeyama, Pack, and Herman (1999) examined memory for recently performed
novel events in a bottlenosed dolphin (Tursiops truncates) by instructing the dolphin (through
the use of gestural signs) to use a particular part of her body to perform an action with specific
objects located in her tank (e.g., use tail flukes to hit the beach ball). After some trials, the
dolphin was unexpectedly presented with the sign for “repeat,” instructing her to repeat the novel
action she had recently performed. The dolphin successfully repeated the novel behavior at
levels that were significantly above chance. These findings suggest that at least one dolphin was
capable of remembering multiple components of a behavior that she recently performed when
she presumably was unaware that she would be requested to repeat the behavior. However, this
performance could be accomplished through procedural memory, as the dolphin only had to
repeat the behavior she recently performed without necessarily having any reference to the past.
In a different paradigm using unanticipated memory tests, Skov-Rackette, Miller, &
Shettleworth (2006) examined memory for what-where-when information in pigeons. The
pigeons were trained on three separate tasks: 1) an identity matching-to-sample task in which the
pigeon had to respond to the recently presented stimulus, 2) a spatial matching-to-sample task in
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which the pigeon had to respond to the location where the stimulus was presented, and 3) a
temporal discrimination task in which the pigeon had to report how much time had elapsed since
the stimulus was presented (3 s vs. 6 s) by responding to one of two symbols which represented
these two intervals. After being trained on these separate tasks, the pigeons were presented with
a new task in which the question type varied across trials and the pigeons were not cued as to
which question would be presented. If pigeons simultaneously encoded what, where, and when
information in memory, they should have responded at above chance levels on any given trial
with any question type. However, the pigeons demonstrated reduced accuracy for when
information, but maintained high accuracy for what and where memory, suggesting that these
three components were not integrated in memory.
What & Where Memory - Unprompted Recall of Events in a Chimpanzee. C. Menzel
(1999) investigated recall memory for what and where information after extremely long delays in
Panzee, a language-trained chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes). In this study, the chimpanzee viewed
an experimenter hiding a particular food item in a large wooded area outside of her enclosure. In
contrast to other studies of episodic memory in nonhumans, the chimpanzee spontaneously
conveyed information about the type of item hidden in the woods to an experimentally blind
caretaker using her large vocabulary of symbolic lexigrams. She used gestures to accurately
convey information about where the item was hidden to a human caretaker who was unaware of
where the food item was hidden. Panzee was highly accurate at reporting the type of food item
that was hidden and where it was hidden often after very long delays of days or weeks.
Memory for What, Where, When & Who Information in a Gorilla. Schwartz et al. (2002)
examined memory for what and who information about novel events in an adult western lowland
gorilla (Gorilla gorilla gorilla). In a series of experiments, the gorilla was presented with a type
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of fruit (apple, orange, banana, pear or grapes) by one of three familiar experimenters. The
gorilla later was presented with a set of large wooden cards that contained pictures of the five
food items and another set of cards that symbolically represented the three experimenters used in
the task. The gorilla was significantly above chance at indicating both the type of fruit and the
experimenter involved in the event after both short retention intervals (7 m) and long retention
intervals (24 h). In another study, the gorilla was also highly accurate at reporting components
of novel events involving both familiar and unfamiliar individuals (Schwartz et al. 2004).
In another study, Schwartz et al. (2005) conducted two separate studies investigating
whether the gorilla was capable of remembering separate information about where an event
occurred and when an event occurred relative to other events in the past. The results indicated
that the gorilla was above chance at demonstrating memory for where information by selecting
the appropriate photo of the event location, but was less accurate at reporting information
concerning the temporal order of a series of three events.
What & Where Memory - Computer Tasks with Monkeys. Washburn and Gulledge
(2002; Washburn, Gulledge & Martin, 2003) examined the integration of what and where
memory in joystick-trained rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) using a computerized task
modeled after the children’s memory game, Concentration. The task was not designed to
examine episodic memory, but to examine memory for both what and where information about
past events in working memory. In this task, the monkeys were presented with an array of cards
on a computer screen that they were able to “flip over” by using a joystick to reveal the picture
on the card. The monkeys were trained to find the card that matched the one they had just
selected. Although the data indicated that the macaques had some knowledge of what cards had
been seen and which locations were previously visited, the monkeys made frequent perseverative
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errors when required to integrate what and where information in memory (i.e., they would
occasionally continue to select the pair that they had just selected despite the fact that it was
incorrect). The authors speculated that this may have been due to the fact that the monkeys were
unable to use language to encode information about the multiple locations and objects within the
array, which may have accounted for their relatively low accuracy.
Summary
The experimental paradigms reviewed here capture essential elements of episodic
memory. The experiments with food-caching scrub jays have demonstrated integrated memory
for what, where, and when information after long-term retention intervals when familiarity and
stimulus strength cues have been experimentally controlled. The unanticipated memory tests
used with pigeons and dolphins address the spontaneous retrieval associated with episodic
memory, and unlike the food-caching studies, refer to completed events in the past and not the
present location of food in the environment. It is possible that in the food-caching tasks,
successful performance may not require memory for past events, but may be accomplished
through something more similar to prospective or semantic memory. The studies that have used
unanticipated memory tests with pigeons and dolphins have used another method for
investigating memory for past events by providing unanticipated memory tests after some of the
trials. The unprompted recall studies with a language-trained chimpanzee and the recognition
tests with a gorilla both demonstrate integrated memory for multiple types of information about
past events after long-term delays. However, these studies have not demonstrated memory for
when information in these great ape species. There have been few studies with nonhuman
primates assessing memory for when in addition to what and where memory; the few studies that
have been done did not find evidence for when memory in rhesus monkeys using an adaptation

13
of the food-caching paradigm (Hampton et al., 2005) or evidence for temporal sequencing of
events in a gorilla (Schwartz et al., 2005). In the human literature, temporal information about
when an event took place appears to be a relatively weak memory cue (Wagenaar, 1986), which
may partially explain why there is evidence for integrated what and where information in
nonhuman primates, but less evidence for integration of what, where and when information in
nonhuman primates. However, it is important to note that there are too few studies examining
memory for temporal information for when an event took place in nonhuman primates to draw
any certain conclusions (Hampton et al., 2005; Schwartz et al. 2005).
The purpose of the present study was to examine whether rhesus monkeys are capable of
integrating what, where, and when information in memory using a task in which monkeys were
required to make discrete responses concerning each separate memory component. Although the
Concentration task should have been easier for the monkeys, as they only had to make one
response to a stimulus to indicate memory for both what and where information, the large
number of spatial locations on a two-dimensional computer screen may not have been distinct
enough for the monkeys to encode as unique locations. In contrast to previous studies that have
only examined memory for what, where, and when information in one particular species without
any comparison to human participants, the present study is designed to examine integration of
what, where, and when memory in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and compare their
performance to the performance of human participants. In previous research, the performance
of nonhuman species have typically been compared with what we assume humans would be able
to do in a comparable task, but few studies (with the exception of Washburn & Gulledge, 2002)
have directly compared the performance of humans and nonhuman primates.
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It was predicted that the rhesus monkeys would be significantly above chance at
indicating object information, spatial information, and temporal information about past events,
but that human participants would perform at higher levels than the rhesus monkeys. The human
participants were expected to perform better than rhesus monkeys, and the reason for this
difference in accuracy could be: 1) the ability to rehearse information verbally in working
memory may facilitate performance in humans, or 2) human participants may just be more
accurate at reporting information from past events, even when verbal rehearsal is controlled.
These two possible explanations were tested by comparing performance of human participants in
a control group with participants who were required to perform a distracting verbal task (an
articulatory suppression task) while simultaneously engaged in the memory tasks. It was
predicted that human participants in the control condition would be more accurate than
participants in the articulatory suppression condition. Taken together these findings would
suggest that although species differences may also be present, verbal rehearsal in humans
facilitates memory.
However, I predicted that the pattern of results for both rhesus monkeys and human
participants would demonstrate similar trends and that accuracy in both groups would be
influenced by similar variables (e.g., the length of delay between presentation and test and the
type of information that must be recalled). Specifically, both humans and rhesus monkeys
should be less accurate when tested after long retention intervals than when tested after short
retention intervals. In addition, I predicted that both humans and rhesus monkeys should be less
accurate at reporting when an event took place, than reporting the what or where component of
the event, as the human literature suggests that memory for when information is a less salient
retrieval cue than the other types of information.
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EXPERIMENT 1
In this experiment rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and human participants were
presented with three separate delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) tasks to assess independent
memory for what, where, and when information: 1) an identity delayed matching-to-sample task,
2) a spatial delayed matching-to-sample task, and 3) a symbolic-temporal delayed matching-tosample task. The identity DMTS task required the subject to remember what stimulus was
presented, the spatial DMTS task required the subject to remember where the photo stimulus was
presented, and the temporal DMTS task required the subject to remember when the stimulus was
presented (either 1-s or 10 s in the past).
Method
Participants In this study, rhesus monkeys (N = 4) and human participants (N =40) were
tested. The rhesus monkeys that participated in the study were joystick-trained, adult males,
housed at the Language Research Center. The rhesus monkeys (Gale, Murph, Willie, & Chewie)
had participated in numerous cognitive studies using the computerized testing system developed
at the Language Research Center. In addition, some of these individuals had participated in
previous computerized delayed matching-to-sample tasks and spatial memory tasks (e.g.,
Washburn & Gulledge, 2002; Washburn, et al., 2003; Washburn & Astur, 2003). The monkeys
were never food- or water-deprived for research purposes. Each monkey participated in the
research on a voluntary basis, receiving supplemental food rewards in exchange for participation.
Each monkey had a computerized test system in its home cage and had the opportunity to work
on the task at any time. The human participants (N = 40) were recruited from undergraduate
psychology courses at Georgia State University and received course credit for their participation.
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The participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, an articulatory suppression
condition (n = 20) and a control condition (n = 20).
General Procedure In the DMTS tasks, the rhesus monkeys and human participants
were presented with a brief event, in which a photo appeared at one location on the computer
screen. The event was followed by a “question” in which the participant was presented with a
choice between two alternatives (photos, locations, or temporal symbols, depending on the
DMTS task) and had to select the stimulus corresponding to the event. The rhesus monkeys
completed the tasks while working on the test systems in their home cage. The tasks were
presented during 4-h testing sessions, which were presented 3 to 5 days each week. The total
number of trials each monkey completed was determined by their motivation to participate in the
task. In each task, monkeys were reinforced for correct responses with positive auditory
feedback and the presentation of a 97-mg banana flavored Noyes primate chow pellet, delivered
by an automatic pellet dispenser. After incorrect responses, monkeys were presented with
negative auditory feedback (a brief low tone). However, monkeys were not given any timeout
for incorrect responses and were allowed to proceed immediately to the next trial.
The human participants were also tested individually, in a similar fashion to the monkeys,
each in their own room test room with a computer system. The participants completed
comparable tasks, with the exception that they were provided with brief verbal instructions. The
purpose of providing humans with explicit verbal instructions was to ensure that they reached
criterion on these tasks, and that we could compare their performance on subsequent tasks with
the rhesus monkeys. In contrast to the monkeys, who had thousands of trials to learn the tasks,
the human participants had less than an hour to complete all of the tasks. In pilot testing with
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human participants, some of the tasks were not clear to the participants (especially the temporal
DMTS task).
As the principle purpose of the study was to examine memory processes, and not learning
processes, I decided to provide the humans with verbal instructions to ensure that they
understood the objective of the task. Although human participants did not receive any food
reinforcement for correct responses, they did receive the same auditory feedback for correct and
incorrect responses as did the rhesus monkeys. The participants in the articulatory suppression
condition (n = 20) and control condition (n = 20) received the same instructions, with the
exception that participants in the articulatory suppression condition were told that they would be
required to repeat the word “the” aloud while completing the tasks. In order to ensure that they
completed the articulatory suppression task, the participants were told that they would be
monitored (using a baby monitor) to ensure that they were engaged in the task. The purpose of
the articulatory suppression task was to examine whether the inability to verbally rehearse
information about past events affected accuracy.
Identity Delayed Matching-to-Sample The identity delayed matching-to-sample task was
used to assess memory for what information in rhesus monkeys and human participants. In this
task, the photo stimulus was randomly selected on each trial from a set of 80 clipart photos of
different items (e.g., fruits, vegetables, monkeys, animals, and objects). The sample photo
randomly appeared at one of the four corners of the computer screen and flashed every second
for a total of three seconds. The photo disappeared and was followed by a 1-s delay in which the
computer screen remained blank. The subjects then were presented with a choice between two
alternatives, the previously presented sample photo and an alternate photo that had not been
presented (see Figure 2.1). The monkeys received feedback concerning their response, followed
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by a brief intertrial interval (1 s). The monkeys completed this task when they reached a
criterion of 75% correct over the last 100 trials. The human participants were presented with the
same general task, but were given verbal instructions and completed a smaller number of trials
(10 trials). The human participants in both conditions were told that they would be presented
with a brief event on the computer screen and would have to report information about what had
been presented.

Identity DMTS
Presentation

Test

Figure 2.1 Identity Delayed Matching-to-Sample.

Spatial Delayed Matching-to-Sample The rhesus monkeys and human participants were
presented with a spatial delayed matching-to-sample task after being trained on the identity
delayed matching-to-sample task. In this task, the number of response locations was reduced
from four to two locations, as pilot testing with the rhesus monkeys revealed that with four
locations the monkeys’ performance never exceeded chance levels. In addition, the response
location boxes were filled with a light yellow background to make the locations more visually
distinctive (see Figure 2.2). In this task, the photo stimulus (a photo of strawberry) remained the

19
same on every trial, but the location where the photo appeared was randomly selected on each
trial. The strawberry photo appeared at one of the two locations on the computer screen and
flashed every second for a total of three seconds. The photo disappeared and was followed by a
one second delay in which the computer screen remained blank. The subjects then were
presented with a choice between the two response locations. This was followed by a brief
intertrial interval (1 s). The monkeys completed this task when they reached a criterion of 75%
correct in a block of 100 trials. The human participants completed a smaller number of trials (10
trials) and were told that they would be presented with a brief event on the computer screen and
would have to report information about where they had seen the event.

Spatial DMTS
Presentation

Test

Figure 2.2 Spatial Delayed Matching-to-Sample.

Temporal Delayed Matching-to-Sample The rhesus monkeys and human participants
then were presented with a symbolic delayed-matching-to-sample task in order to assess memory
for temporal information. In this task, subjects were required to indicate delay length between
the presentation of the event and subsequent memory test using temporal symbols. In this task, a
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photo appeared in the center of the screen and then disappeared after a brief interval (3 s). The
disappearance of the photo was followed by either a short retention interval (1 s) or a long
retention interval (10 s), which was randomly determined on each trial. After the delay, the
subjects were presented with a choice between two arbitrary stimuli (a purple triangle and a
black circle). If the delay between the presentation and test was short (1 s), reinforcement was
given for selecting the purple triangle. In contrast, if the delay between the presentation and test
was long (10 s), subjects were reinforced for selecting the black circle (see Figure 2.3). In this
task, the rhesus monkeys had to learn to select the purple circle if the event was presented
recently, but select the black circle if the event was presented in the more distant past (after a
10-s delay). Some of the monkeys first completed a simpler version of the task, in which the
purple triangle and black circle were always positioned in the same locations on each trial.
These monkeys were then presented with a more advanced version of the task, in which the
locations of the temporal symbols was randomly determined on each trial. In this version, the
task could not be solved by simply moving the cursor to the left if the delay was short or moving
the cursor to the right if the delay was long, but instead required an understanding of the
temporal symbols. The monkeys completed this task when they reached a criterion of 75%
correct over the last 100 trials.
The human participants completed a smaller number of trials (10 trials) and were told that
they would be presented with a brief event on the computer screen and would have to report how
long ago the event was presented. They were told that if the delay was short they were to select
one symbol (the purple triangle) but if the delay was long they were to select another symbol (the
black circle). These specific instructions were given, as pilot testing revealed that participants
did not understand the task requirements when no verbal instructions were presented. As the
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purpose of the study was to compare memory processes in nonhuman primates and human
participants, and not learning of arbitrary task rules, I felt it was necessary to ensure that the
human participants understood what the symbols represented rather than allow them to learn
those rules over many trials.

Temporal DMTS
Presentation

Test

Figure 2.3 Temporal Delayed Matching-to-Sample.

Hypotheses

I predicted that both rhesus monkeys and human participants would be

highly accurate on all three of the DMTS tasks (at levels significantly above chance
performance). However, I expected that human participants in the articulatory suppression
condition would be less accurate than participants in the control condition on all of the DMTS
tasks. In addition, it was predicted that the length of retention interval would affect when
accuracy in both the monkeys and human participants (i.e., performance would be significantly
better for short retention interval trials compared to long retention interval trials).
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Results
Identity Delayed Matching-to-Sample

The rhesus monkeys and human participants in

both conditions were significantly above chance (50%) on the identity DMTS task, as analyzed a
binomial test, p < .001 (see Table 2.1 for descriptive statistics). The difference in accuracy
between the control condition and the articulatory suppression condition was not significant, as
determined by a chi-square difference test, χ2(1, N= 400) = 0.34, p > .10.

Table 2.1 The percent correct for the identity, spatial, and temporal DMTS tasks.
Identity
DMTS
Monkeys

Trials

Gale
7,394
Murph 23,966
Willie
4,459
Chewie 7,553

Spatial
DMTS

Correct

Trials

Nonsymbolic
Temporal DMTS

Correct

Trials

Correct

Symbolic
Temporal DMTS
Trials

Correct

90%
97%
89%
85%

* 16,374
* 21,587
* 9,834
* 8,653

87%
93%
73%
77%

* 5,326
* ------* 25,866
* 2,927

81%
------92%
89%

* 11,433
10,901
* 22,045
* 1,798

87%
91%
89%
91%

*
*
*
*

99%
100%

*
*

100%
100%

*
*

-------------

200
200

95%
92%

*
*

Humans
Control
AS

200
200

200
200

-------------

Note: An asterisk indicates above chance performance, as analyzed by a binomial test, p < .001

The rhesus monkeys completed a larger number of trials than the human participants.
The percent correct during the first 100 trials was compared to the last 100 trials completed to
determine whether accuracy increased as a result of experience with the task (see Table 2.2).
Although only two of the monkeys, Murph and Willie, performed at levels significantly above
chance during the first 100 trials, all of the monkeys were significantly above chance during the
last 100 trials, as determined by a binomial test, p < .001. For the two monkeys who were not
initially above chance during the first 100 trials (Gale and Chewie), the increase in accuracy
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during the last 100 trials compared to the first 100 trials was significantly different, as
determined by a chi-square difference test, Gale, χ2(1, N = 200) = 23.58, p < .001; Chewie, χ2(1,
N = 200) = 23.58, p < .001.

Table 2.2 Accuracy during the first 100 and last 100 trials on each DMTS task.
Identity
DMTS
First
Last

Spatial
DMTS
First
Last

Nonsymbolic
Temporal DMTS
First
Last

Symbolic
Temporal DMTS
First
Last

Gale
56%
87% * 43%
96% * 50%
89% * 75% * 90% *
Murph 92% * 93% * 43%
99% * ------49%
100% *
Willie
78% * 90% * 47%
63% * 50%
87% * 69% * 95% *
Chewie 40%
74% * 53%
96% * 51%
100% * 71% * 90% *
Note: An asterisk indicates above chance performance, as analyzed by a binomial test, p < .01.

Spatial Delayed Matching-to-Sample

The rhesus monkeys and human participants in

both conditions were significantly above chance (50%) on the spatial DMTS task, as analyzed a
binomial test, p < .001 (see Table 2.1 for descriptive statistics). The difference in accuracy
between the control condition and the articulatory suppression condition was not significant, as
determined by a chi-square difference test, χ2(1, N = 400) = 1.00, p > .01.
The rhesus monkeys completed a larger of number of trials than the human participants.
The percent correct during the first 100 trials was compared to the last 100 trials completed to
determine whether accuracy increased as a result of experience with the task (see Table 2.2).
The rhesus monkeys all performed at chance levels during the first 100 trials, but were
significantly above chance during the last 100 trials completed, as analyzed by a binomial test, p
< .001. There difference in accuracy between the first 100 and last 100 trials was significant for
three individuals, , Gale, χ2(1, N = 200) = 66.26, p < .001; Murph, χ2(1, N = 200) = 76.15, p <
.001; Chewie, χ2(1, N = 200) = 48.66, p < .001.
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Temporal Delayed Matching-to-Sample In this task, three monkeys first completed a
simple nonsymbolic temporal DMTS training task, in which the temporal response symbols
always remained in the same positions. After reaching criterion (75%) correct on this task, the
monkeys were presented with the symbolic-temporal DMTS task, in which the left and right
positions of the symbols were randomly determined on each trial. In order to determine whether
this training task was necessary to learn the symbolic discrimination, one monkey, Murph, did
not complete the first training task and began immediately on the symbolic-temporal DMTS task.
Nonsymbolic DMTS Training

The rhesus monkeys were all significantly above

chance (50%) on the nonsymbolic DMTS task, as determined by a binomial test, p < .001 (see
Table 2.1). In comparing accuracy for the first 100 trials and the last 100 trials, it was found that
all of the monkeys performed at chance levels during the first 100 trials, but were significantly
above chance during the last 100 trials, as determined by a binomial test, p < .001 (see Table
2.2). The increase in accuracy during the last 100 trials compared to the first 100 trials was
significant for each individual, Gale, χ2(1, N = 200) = 35.88, p < .001; Willie, χ2(1, N = 200) =
31.72, p < .001; Chewie, χ2(1, N = 200) = 64.90, p < .001.
Symbolic-Temporal DMTS The rhesus monkeys and human participants were all
significantly above chance (50%) on the symbolic DMTS task, as determined by a binomial test,
p < .001 (see Table 2.1). The monkeys who had previous experience working on the
nonsymbolic training version of the task were above chance during the first 100 trials completed,
as determined by a binomial test, p < .01, but the monkey that did not have any previous
experience with the nonsymbolic version of the task (Murph) performed at chance levels during
the initial 100 trials. However, this individual, along with the other monkeys, demonstrated
above chance performance during the last 100 trials completed, as determined by a binomial test,
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p < .001 (see Table 2.2). The monkey that did not have prior experience with the nonsymbolic
training task demonstrated errorless performance during the last 100 trials completed, suggesting
that although helpful in initial task acquisition, the training task was not necessary to learn the
symbolic discrimination. The increase in accuracy from the first 100 trials completed to the last
100 trials completed was significant for all four monkeys, as determined by a chi-square
difference test, Gale, χ2(1, N = 200) = 7.79, p = .005; Murph, χ2(1, N = 200) = 68.46 p < .001;
Willie, χ2(1, N = 200) = 22.9, p < .001; Chewie, χ2(1, N = 200) = 11.5, p = .001.

Table 2.3 Accuracy after short and long delays on the symbolic temporal DMTS task.
All Trials
Short

First 100 Trials

Long

Short

Last 100 Trials

Long

Short

Long

81%
100%
91%
84%

* 100% *
* 100% *
* 100% *
* 96% *

-------

-------

Monkeys
Gale
Murph
Willie
Chewie

83%
90%
88%
93%

*
*
*
*

90%
91%
90%
90%

*
*
*
*

76%
52%
76%
85%

96%
91%

*
*

93%
92%

*
*

-------

*
*
*

75%
47%
63%
56%

*

Humans
Control
AS

-------

Note: An asterisk indicates above chance performance, as analyzed by a binomial test, p < .001.

The rhesus monkeys and human participants were significantly above chance on both
short retention interval trials and long retention interval trials, as analyzed using a binomial test,
p < .001 (see Table 2.3). An analysis of the last 100 trials completed revealed that, for three of
the monkeys, accuracy was significantly better for long retention interval trials than short
retention intervals (Gale, χ2(1, N = 200) = 10.26, p = .001; Willie, χ2(1, N = 200) = 4.48, p =
.034; Chewie, χ2(1, N = 200) = 4.27, p = .039. However, the length of the retention interval did
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not significantly affect performance for the human participants in either condition [control, χ2(1,
N = 200) = 1.14, p > .05; articulatory suppression, χ2(1, N = 200) = 0.04 , p > .05].
Discussion
The rhesus monkeys and human participants were above chance on each of the separate
DMTS tasks, as predicted, suggesting that both monkeys and humans were able to retrieve these
separate memory components from working memory after brief retention intervals. The role of
verbal rehearsal did not affect performance on any of the separate DMTS tasks, as participants in
the articulatory suppression group did not perform significantly different than participants in the
control condition. The rhesus monkeys completed a larger number of trials than the human
participants, and accuracy did improve as experience with the task increased, suggesting that the
monkeys’ memory for these components can be facilitated through increased task experience.
However, the prediction that monkeys and humans would be better when tested after short
retention intervals than long retention intervals was not supported. In fact, the rhesus monkeys
performed better when tested after long retention intervals compared to short retention intervals.
It is possible that long retention intervals (10 s) were more aversive to the rhesus monkeys than
short retention intervals, and that the aversive quality of the delay may have made the event more
salient.
EXPERIMENT 2
The rhesus monkeys were able to perform each of the separate DMTS tasks at levels
significantly above chance, but Experiment 2 was designed to examine whether monkeys were
able to report two components (what and where information) from the same event. In this
experiment, the monkeys were presented with the same type of event on the computer screen, but
then were required to report where the photo had been presented, and what photo had been
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presented. The questions were asked in this order on all trials to avoid any interference effects.
That is, if the identity question were presented first, the monkey would have to make a matchto-sample response to a location on the screen (which may or may not correspond to the location
of the event) before making a response to the event location. It is possible that the monkeys
would become confused by the task and select the location that they had just selected using the
joystick cursor, not the location where the event was shown.
Method
Participants

The same four rhesus monkeys that were trained on the separate DMTS

and tasks in Experiment 1 served as subjects in this experiment. The human participants did not
participate in this experiment, as the purpose of this experiment was to determine whether
monkeys would be able to understand the task of reporting more than one component from the
same event. The identity and spatial components were chosen for this task, under the assumption
that if the monkeys were able to understand this format, the temporal question could be added to
the sequence of questions in the next experiment.
Procedure

The monkey had to move the joystick cursor to a start box in the center of

the screen in order to start a trial. A stimulus photo was randomly selected (from a set of 80
photos) on each trial and was randomly assigned to appear in one of two locations on the screen
(see Figure 3.1). The photo flashed in the location once per second, lasting three seconds in
total. The photo then disappeared and was followed by retention interval (1 s, 5 s, 10 s, or 20 s).
After the retention interval, the monkey was presented with a choice between the two response
locations (i.e., the spatial question).
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Experiment 2: What & Where Memory
Event

Where Question

What Question

Figure 3.1 What & Where Memory Task

If correct, the monkey received positive sound feedback and a fruit-flavored pellet.
However, if the spatial-memory response was incorrect, a brief low tone was presented. The
monkey was then presented with a choice between the sample photo and a distractor photo, each
in random positions on the screen (i.e., the identity question). Again, if the monkeys were
correct they received positive sound feedback and a fruit-flavored pellet, but heard a low buzz on
errors. There was a brief intertrial interval (1 s) before the next trial was available to the monkey.
The monkeys were initially presented with 1-s retention intervals, but progressed to a longer
retention interval (5 s) when they reached criterion (75% correct). Similarly, after reaching
criterion on the 5-s retention intervals, the animals were tested with 10-s retention intervals. This
continued until the monkeys reached 20-s retention intervals.
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Hypotheses

It was predicted that the monkeys would be significantly above chance for

each of the retention intervals (1 s, 5 s, 10 s, 20 s). However, it was expected that there would be
a general trend of decreasing accuracy for each of the retention interval lengths.
Results
The rhesus monkeys were each significantly above chance (50%) at reporting what
information and where information for each of the retention intervals (1 s, 5 s, 10 s, 20 s), as
analyzed by a binomial test, p < .001 (see Table 3.1). The initial accuracy (the first 100 trials)
was compared to the final accuracy (the last 100 trials) to determine if initial performance was
above chance and whether increased experience with the task facilitated performance.

Table 3.1 Accuracy for 1-s, 5-s, 10-s, and 20-s retention intervals.
Trials

Where

What

1-s Retention Interval
Gale
588
Murph
466
Willie
24,568
Chewie 9,862

80%
97%
84%
96%

*
*
*
*

83%
92%
88%
78%

*
*
*
*

Gale
4,584
Murph
8,087
Willie
28,355
Chewie 8,955

77%
88%
63%
92%

*
*
*
*

88%
93%
86%
79%

*
*
*
*

Gale
Murph
Willie
Chewie

5,917
9,654
9,455
8,654

82%
91%
63%
85%

*
*
*
*

93%
93%
89%
78%

*
*
*
*

Gale
Murph
Willie
Chewie

4,034
768
3,971
781

74%
76%
58%
77%

*
*
*
*

91%
89%
88%
75%

*
*
*
*

5-s Retention Interval

10-s Retention Interval

20-s Retention Interval

Note: An asterisk indicates above chance performance, as analyzed by a binomial test, p < .001
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1-s Retention Interval

The rhesus monkeys were each significantly above chance

during the first 100 trials of the first task (1-s retention intervals), suggesting that the task of
reporting multiple components was not difficult for the monkeys, p < .01. For some individuals,
accuracy increased significantly from the first 100 trials to the last 100 trials. Specifically, one
monkey (Chewie) was significantly more accurate at reporting where information during the
final 100 trials of the task than during the initial 100 trials, χ2(1, N = 200) = 14.20, p < .001.
Two individuals (Chewie and Gale) were significantly more accurate at reporting what
information during the last 100 trials compared to the first 100 trials, Chewie , χ2(1, N = 200) =
13.67, p < .001, and Gale, χ2(1, N = 200) = 5.10, p = .024 (see Table 3.2).
5-s Retention Interval In this task, the monkeys were required to respond after a longer
retention interval, and this task (specifically the task of having to report spatial information after
a delay) was initially difficult for the monkeys, as they were not above chance at reporting where
information during the first 100 trials completed, as analyzed by a binomial test, p > .05.
However, increased experience with the task facilitated performance, as there was a significant
increase in accuracy for where information during the last 100 trials compared to the first 100
trials for each of the monkeys, Gale χ2(1, N = 200) = 33.68, p < .001; Murph, χ2(1, N = 200) =
51.43, p < .001; Willie, χ2(1, N = 200) = 6.17 p = .013; Chewie, χ2(1, N = 200) = 31.23, p <
.001. In contrast, the monkeys were immediately accurate at reporting what information after the
delay, demonstrating significantly above chance accuracy for reporting what information during
the first 100 trials of the task (see Table 3.2).
10-s Retention Interval

After the monkeys had experience responding after a longer

delay (5 s), they were able to proceed to the next retention interval (10 s) with minimal difficulty,
as performance was significantly above chance during the first 100 trials of the 10 s retention
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interval task, p < .01. The increase in accuracy for reporting where information during the last
100 trials compared to the first 100 trials was significant for one monkey, Gale, χ2(1, N = 200) =
22.84, p < .001. However, the increase in accuracy for reporting what information during the
last 100 trials compared to the first 100 trials was not significant for any of the monkeys (see
Table 3.2).

Table 3.2 Accuracy for each retention interval during the first and last 100 trials.

Where
1-s Retention Interval
Gale
Murph
Willie
Chewie

85%
98%
75%
80%

5-s Retention Interval
Gale
Murph
Willie
Chewie

56%
55%
54%
61%

10-s Retention Interval
Gale
Murph
Willie
Chewie

64%
88%
66%
86%

20-s Retention Interval
Gale
Murph
Willie
Chewie

60%
87%
64%
67%

First 100
What

*
*
*
*

Last 100
Where

What

77%
88%
86%
66%

*
*
*
*

92%
93%
77%
97%

*
*
*
*

89%
93%
89%
88%

*
*
*
*

83%
94%
81%
90%

*
*
*
*

92%
98%
71%
94%

*
*
*
*

91%
91%
84%
82%

*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*

90%
91%
86%
68%

*
*
*
*

92%
90%
69%
87%

*
*
*
*

83%
94%
87%
76%

*
*
*
*

*
*
*

87%
93%
90%
78%

*
*
*
*

69%
74%
55%
83%

*
*

91%
85%
87%
75%

*
*
*
*

*

Note: An asterisk indicates above chance performance, as analyzed by a binomial test, p < .01

20-s Retention Interval

The monkeys were all significantly above chance at reporting

what information during the first 100 of the 20-s retention interval task, but only three of the
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monkeys were above chance at reporting where information during the first 100 trials, suggesting
that the increase in delay was difficult for one of the monkeys. The increase in accuracy for
reporting where information during the last 100 trials compared to the first 100 trials was
significant for two of the monkeys, Murph χ2(1, N = 200) = 5.83, p = .02, and Chewie, h χ2(1, N
= 200) = 6.83, p = .009. However, the increase in accuracy for reporting what information
during the last 100 trials compared to the first 100 trials was not significant for any of the
monkeys (see Table 3.2).
Discussion
In the previous tasks, the monkeys had not been required to make multiple responses
after the event presentation, so one might predict that the purpose of the task would not be
immediately apparent. However, the monkeys acquired an understanding of the task
immediately, and were able to report both what information and where information after varying
retention intervals. The results confirm that rhesus monkeys are able to retain and report
multiple components of past events using this paradigm. However, this study was not designed
to test whether multiple components are bound together in memory (which is assessed in
Experiment 3). The purpose of this study was to ensure that monkeys were able to understand
the paradigm and the specific format for reporting multiple components, as well as to ensure that
the monkeys would be able to report information after varying delays. In the next experiment,
however, the integration of what, where, and when was tested explicitly in both rhesus monkeys
and human participants.
EXPERIMENT 3
In this experiment, rhesus monkeys and human participants were required to report all
three components of the event (what, where, when) after presentation of the event. In another
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task, both monkeys and humans were required to report only one component of the event (that
was randomly selected on each trial). In this task, participants could not anticipate which
response they would be required to make because they were not aware which question they
would receive.
Method
Participants

The same rhesus monkeys and human participants that were initially

trained on the three separate DMTS tasks also participated in this experiment. Therefore, all of
the participants had experience with each of the separate tasks before being required to report
multiple components from the same event. In addition, the rhesus monkeys also had experience
in reporting both where and what components in Experiment 2, in order to determine whether
they would be capable of understanding the task and report multiple components (what and
where information) from past events.
Reporting All Three Components Sequentially In this task, a randomly selected photo
randomly appeared at one of the two locations. The presentation was followed by either a short
retention interval (1 s) or a long retention interval (10 s), which was randomly determined on
each trial. Then, the rhesus monkeys were presented with the where question, the what question,
and the when question sequentially (see Figure 4.1). The questions were presented in the order
stated above to minimize interference (e.g., if one were to ask the what or when question first,
the animal must make a response to a location on the screen, and this may interfere with the
memory for where the actual event took place). If the monkey responded correctly to one of the
questions, it received positive auditory feedback and a fruit flavored pellet. If the monkey
responded incorrectly to one of three questions, it received negative auditory feedback and no
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pellet reinforcement. However, all three questions were presented even if the participant
responded incorrectly to one of the questions in the sequence.

Reporting All Three Components Sequentially

DELAY

Figure 4.1 Reporting All Three Components Sequentially

Unanticipated Question Type Although the experiment described above is one method of
assessing whether what, where, and when information is integrated in memory, it was also be
necessary to present this same task in which only one question is randomly selected for
presentation on each trial in order to assess whether interference or decay processes interfere
with retrieval. For example, asking the questions sequentially may interfere with the ability to
remember the event itself, or the question may no longer be straightforward (e.g., asking the
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individual to determine when the event occurred becomes complicated if the individual must
answer several questions beforehand, as the time it takes to respond to these questions increases
the amount of time since the event). In this task, the monkeys and human participants were
unaware of which question they would be asked, as the question type was randomly selected on
each trial (see Figure 4.2). If what, where, and when information is concurrently available in
memory, the monkeys and humans should be significantly above chance at recalling any of the
components, even when they are unaware of which question will be presented.

Unanticipated Question Type

Event

Random Question

DELAY

Figure 4.2 Unanticipated Question Type

The rhesus macaques in this study (N = 4) were presented with both tasks: 1) presentation
of the where, what, and when questions in sequential order and 2) random presentation of one of
the questions on any given trial. If a monkey reached a criterion of 75% correct in a block of
100 trials on the sequential order task, the animal was then presented with the random question
task. As stated previously, however, the sequential question task may cause various interference
effects; therefore, if a monkey failed to reach criterion after 5,000 trials, the animal was still
tested on the unanticipated question task.
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The human participants also were presented with both tasks (the sequential question task
and the random question task) in the same order presented to the rhesus monkeys. The human
participants were informed that the task would require them to remember a past event and report
information concerning the event (specifically what, where, and when the event occurred). As
with Experiment 1, the participants were assigned to one of two conditions, an articulatory
suppression condition and a control condition. If verbal rehearsal facilitates the integration of
what, where, and when information in memory, the participants who were required to perform
the articulatory suppression task should be less accurate than the participants who were not
prevented from rehearsing during the retention interval.
Hypotheses

It was predicted that both rhesus monkeys and human participants would

demonstrate simultaneous memory for what, where, and when information, and that there would
be evidence of what-where-when integration in both monkeys and human participants. The
human participants were expected to do better than the rhesus monkeys, and the participants in
the control condition were expected to do better than those in the articulatory suppression
condition. It was also predicted that accuracy for what and where information would be higher
than accuracy for when information in both humans and monkeys. I also expected both monkeys
and humans would perform better when presented with short retention interval trials than when
presented with long retention interval trials.
Results
Reporting All Three Components Sequentially

The rhesus monkeys were significantly

above chance (50%) at reporting what information and where information, and two monkeys
were also significantly above chance at reporting when information, as analyzed using a binomial
test, p < .001 (for descriptive statistics, see Table 4.1). The human participants in both the
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control condition and the articulatory suppression condition were significantly above chance at
reporting what information, where information, and when information from the event, as
analyzed using a binomial test, p < .001 (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1

The percentage correct for what, where, and when information.
Where

When

What

Reporting All Three Components
Rhesus Monkeys
Gale
Murph
Willie
Chewie
Human Participants
Control
AS

3,218
2,771
6,536
1,163

400
400

85%
93%
69%
89%

*
*
*
*

100% *
100% *

*
*
*
*

57%
50%
63% *
63% *

100% *
100% *

95% *
94% *

93%
96%
84%
82%

Unanticipated Question Type
Rhesus Monkeys
Gale
Murph
Willie
Chewie
Human Participants
Control
AS

1,091
2,209
1,803
2,193

400
400

86%
92%
68%
88%

*
*
*
*

100% *
98% *

97%
96%
90%
84%

*
*
*
*

100% *
100% *

80%
75%
85%
89%

*
*
*
*

94% *
96% *

Note: An asterisk indicates above chance performance, as analyzed by a binomial test, p < .001

The conditional probabilities of accuracy were analyzed to determine whether the rhesus
monkeys and human participants were more likely to be correct on any given question type,
given correct performance on the preceding question type(s). If working memory for what and
where information were bound together, the conditional probability of correctly responding to
the what question, given correct performance on the where question, should be higher than the
overall accuracy for what information (i.e., accuracy for what information independent of
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performance on where). However, there was no difference in accuracy between conditional
probabilities of what given correct performance on where and actual percent correct for what
information in both the rhesus monkeys and human participants. In addition, if working
memory for what, where, and when information are bound together, the conditional probability
of correctly responding to the when component, given correct performance on both what and
where questions, should be significantly higher than the probability of correctly responding to
the when question (independent of whether previous responses were correct or incorrect). There
were differences between the conditional probabilities of when given correct performance on
what and where and the actual percent correct for rhesus monkeys, but these differences were not
significant, Gale, χ2(1, N = 3,218) = 0.49, p > .05; Murph, χ2(1, N = 2,771) = 1.41, p > .05.
There was also no difference between the conditional and actual percent correct for the human
participants (see Table 4.2).
The conditional probabilities were also analyzed using binomial logistic regression to
determine whether accuracy on one question predicted accuracy on subsequent questions. The
results indicated that where accuracy predicted what performance for one monkey, Willie, χ2(1,
N = 6536) = 8.78, Exp(B) = 0.81, p < .01. The odds ratio (Exp(B)) refers to the increase in the
dependent variable (i.e., correctly reporting the what component of the event) that is associated
with each unit increase in the independent variable (i.e., correctly reporting the where component
of the event). The odds of Willie correctly reporting what information increased by a factor of
0.81 if he had correctly reported the where component of the event. The results also indicated
that accuracy on what and where questions predicted when accuracy for two monkeys, Gale,
χ2(1, N = 3,218) = 4.29, Exp(B) = 1.20, p < .05; Murph, χ2(1, N = 2,771) = 24.70, Exp(B) = 1.89,
p < .001. If Gale had correctly reported the what and where components of the event, the odds of
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him reporting the when component of the event increased by a factor of 1.2. If Murph had
correctly reported the what and where components of the event, the odds of him reporting the
when component of the event increased by a factor of 1.89. It was impossible to conduct a
binomial logistic regression analysis to determine whether where accuracy predicted what
accuracy for human participants in both conditions because each group demonstrated 100%
accuracy for one of the memory components. However, it was possible to determine whether
what and where accuracy predicted when accuracy, but the results were not significant for both
groups, χ2(1, N = 400) = 0.00, p < .05.

Table 4.2 The conditional probabilities of being correct on one question given correct
performance on the preceding question(s).
What

Monkeys
Gale
Murph
Willie
Chewie
Humans
Control
AS

When

Conditional

overall

conditional

overall

(correct where)

percent correct

( what + where)

percent correct

93.23%
96.57%
85.26%
81.77%

93.04%
96.43%
84.36%
81.51%

55.75%
47.94%
62.72%
63.58%

56.68%
49.58%
62.81%
63.28%

99.75%
100.00%

99.75%
100.00%

94.74%
93.48%

94.75%
93.50%

The accuracy levels for short retention interval trials and long retention interval trials
(from the last 100 trials completed) were compared to determine whether the length of delay
affected accuracy for reporting the three memory components (see Table 4.3). There was a trend
for some monkeys to perform better on both the what and where questions after short retention
intervals. Specifically, two monkeys (Gale and Murph) were more accurate at reporting what
information on short interval trials, [Gale, χ2(1, N = 200) = 4.78, p < .05, and Willie, χ2(1, N =
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200) = 7.41, p < .01], and one monkey (Chewie) was more accurate at reporting where
information on short retention interval trials, χ2(1, N = 200) = 7.71, p < .01. In contrast, for the
when question, the opposite pattern was observed; some monkeys were more accurate on long
retention intervals compared to short retention intervals.

These monkeys were the individuals

who performed at chance levels on the temporal component (Gale and Murph). These
individuals were only above chance on long retention intervals.

Table 4.3 The accuracy for all components on short RI trials and long RI trials. The table
displays accuracy for the last 100 trials completed for the monkeys and accuracy for all trials
completed for the human participants.
Where
Short Long

What
Short Long

When
Short Long

Reporting All Three Components
Rhesus Monkeys
Gale
Murph
Willie
Chewie

94%
100%
76%
100%

89%
93%
64%
85%

98%
93%
95%
77%

87%
98%
76%
83%

37%
0%
76%
62%

63%
100%
62%
77%

Human Participants
Control
AS

100%
100%

100%
99%

100%
100%

99%
100%

95%
95%

94%
92%

Rhesus Monkeys
Gale
Murph
Willie
Chewie

96%
96%
88%
93%

74%
89%
57%
75%

100%
100%
95%
80%

98%
96%
88%
80%

89%
93%
94%
81%

73%
91%
79%
94%

Human Participants
Control
AS

100%
100%

100%
96%

100%
100%

100%
100%

92%
99%

96%
94%

Unanticipated Question Type

It is possible that, for those two individuals, the time required to answer each question
before reaching the when question may have increased the delay length since the original event
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presentation, making it difficult for the monkeys to respond to this question. If this was the case,
we would expect to find a bias in selecting the long delay symbol for these individuals. An
analysis of all trials completed revealed that one of the monkeys (Murph) was indeed
significantly more likely to select the long delay symbol (97%) than the short delay symbol (3%)
as determined by a binomial test, p < .001. The other monkey (Gale) also demonstrated this bias,
but to a lesser and nonsignificant extent, selecting the long delay symbol (55%) more often than
the short delay symbol (45%). The human participants in both groups performed equally well
on both short and long retention intervals. Specifically, there was no difference in accuracy for
what or where information for short and long delays. In addition, the difference in accuracy for
when information after short delays and long delays was not significant, χ2(1, N = 127) = 0.36, p
> .05.
The rhesus monkeys completed more trials than human participants. In order to
determine whether experience with the task affected performance in the rhesus monkeys, a chisquare difference test was used to determine whether accuracy was significantly higher during
the last 100 trials compared to the first 100 trials (for descriptive statistics, see Table 4.4). The
rhesus monkeys were all significantly above chance at correctly indicating what information and
where information during the first 100 trials of the task, as analyzed using a binomial test, p <
.01, but none of the monkeys were above chance at reporting when information during these
initial 100 trials, p > .05. However, an analysis of the last 100 trials completed revealed that in
addition to being above chance at reporting what and where information, two of the monkeys had
also reached significantly above chance performance for reporting the when component of the
event, p < .001 (see Table 4.4). The monkeys were not significantly better at reporting what
information during the last 100 trials than during the initial 100 trials of the task, p > .05.
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However, three monkeys did perform significantly better on the where question during the last
100 trials compared to the first 100 trials, as analyzed using a chi-square difference test, Gale,
χ2(1, N = 200) = 11.48, p = .001; Murph, χ2(1, N = 200) = 18.98, p < .001; Chewie, χ2(1, N =
200) = 11.48, p = .001. In addition, two monkeys performed significantly better on the when
question during the last 100 trials than the first 100 trials, as analyzed using a chi-square
difference test, Willie χ2(1, N = 200) = 6.81, p = .009; Chewie, χ2(1, N = 200) = 10, p = .002.

Table 4.4. The rhesus monkeys accuracy during the first 100 and last 100 trials.
Where
First
Reporting All Three Components
Gale
Murph
Willie
Chewie

74%
74%
64%
74%

What
Last

*
*
*
*

92%
96%
71%
92%

First

*
*
*
*

95%
94%
85%
77%

When
Last

*
*
*
*

93%
96%
86%
80%

*
*
*
*

First

Last

54%
51%
52%
48%

49%
54%
70%
70%

Unanticipated Question Type
Gale
90% * 84% * 96% * 99% * 71% * 80%
Murph
91% * 92% * 91% * 98% * 71% * 92%
Willie
67% * 72% * 88% * 92% * 73% * 95%
Chewie
92% * 83% * 82% * 80% * 86% * 87%
Note: An asterisk indicates above chance performance, as analyzed by a binomial test, p < .01

Unanticipated Question Type

*
*

*
*
*
*

The rhesus monkeys were all significantly above chance

for all three trial types (what, where, and when trials) when the question type was randomly
selected on each trial, as analyzed by a binomial test, p < .01 (see Table 4.1). The human
participants in both conditions were also significantly above chance on what, where, and when
trials, as analyzed by a binomial test, p < .001
The percentage correct for each of the three trial types were compared using chi-square
difference tests to determine whether the question types varied in difficulty. The rhesus
monkeys demonstrated individual differences concerning the difficulty levels for the three
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question types (see Table 4.5). For two monkeys, accuracy on what trials was significantly
higher than accuracy on where trials [Gale, χ2(1, N = 200) = 25.97, p < .001; Murph, χ2(1, N =
200) = 8.84, p = .003] and accuracy on where trials was significantly higher than accuracy on
when trials [Gale, χ2(1, N = 200) = 5.65, p = .017; Murph, χ2(1, N = 200) = 78.44, p < .001].
Another monkey, Willie, was significantly more accurate on what trials than when trials, [χ2(1, N
= 200) = 6.11, p = .013] and on when trials than where trials [χ2(1, N = 200) = 48.01, p < .001].
Chewie demonstrated a different pattern; he was equally accurate on when trials and where trials
[χ2(1, N = 200) = 0.03, p > .05], but he was significantly more accurate on where trials than what
trials [χ2(1, N = 200) = 5.35, p = .021], and when trials than what trials [χ2(1, N = 200) = 8.04, p
=.005]. The human participants in both groups were less accurate on when trials than what and
where trials, but the difference was not significant [control group, χ2(1, N = 252) = 0.1, p >.05;
articulatory suppression, χ2(1, N = 262) = 0.01, p > .05].
There were differences in accuracy for short retention interval trials and long retention
interval trials for the rhesus monkeys, but not the human participants (see Table 4.3). One
monkey (Chewie) was significantly more accurate at reporting when information on short
retention interval trials compared to long retention interval trials, χ2(1, N = 100) = 4.04, p < .05.
Three monkeys (Gale, Willie, and Chewie) were more accurate at reporting where information
when the delay was short than when the delay was long, Gale, χ2(1, N = 100) = 8.61, p < .01;
Willie, χ2(1, N = 100) = 11.83, p =.001; Chewie, χ2(1, N = 100) = 6.19, p <.05. In contrast, the
human participants in both conditions did not perform significantly different on short retention
interval trials than long retention interval trials, as analyzed using a binomial test, p > .05.

44
Table 4.5 The rank order of difficulty for each trial type.
Accuracy
High ------------------------------Low
Rhesus Monkeys
Gale
Murph
Willie
Chewie

What
What
What
Where

>
>
>
=

Where
Where
When
When

Control
AS

What
What

= Where
= Where

>
>
>
>

When
When
Where
What

Human Participants
= When
= When

The rhesus monkeys completed more trials than human participants. In order to
determine whether experience with the task affected performance for the rhesus monkeys, a chisquare difference test was used to determine whether accuracy was significantly higher during
the last 100 trials compared to the first 100 trials (see Table 4.4). Each of the monkeys was
significantly above chance on what trials, where trials, and when trials during the first 100 trials
and maintained this performance during the last 100 trials completed, as analyzed by binomial
tests, p < .001. There was a significant increase in accuracy for what trials for one monkey
(Murph) during the last 100 trials compared to the first 100 trials [χ2(1, N = 200) = 4.71, p < .05]
as well as a significant increase in accuracy for when information for two individuals, Murph,
χ2(1, N = 200) = 14.62, p < .001 and Willie, χ2(1, N = 200) = 18.01, p < .001.
Discussion
The rhesus monkeys and human participants demonstrated memory for what, where, and
when information when they were unaware of which question they would be presented on any
given trial, suggesting that all three types of information were concurrently available in working
memory. In addition, some monkeys were able to report all three components sequentially after
each event. There was some evidence that what, where, and when information were integrated in
working memory, as accuracy on both the what and where questions predicted performance on
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the when question. Specifically, two of the monkeys were more likely to be correct on the
temporal question if they had been correct at reporting the object component and spatial
component, suggesting that memory for when an event occurred was bound to memory for what
and where the event occurred. It is important to note that although there was no evidence of
what-where-when integration in the remaining two rhesus monkeys and the human participants,
the fact that both groups were highly accurate on all three questions types may have made it
difficult to detect binding of information in memory. In fact, the monkeys who demonstrated
evidence of binding were the monkeys who were not significantly above chance at reporting the
temporal component of the past event.
The monkeys and human participants were highly accurate on all of the question types,
but there were individual differences with regard to how easily the types of information were
retrieved. There was a general trend that memory for what information was most accurate,
followed by memory for where and when information. However, one monkey actually performed
better on both where and when information than what information. Although Chewie
demonstrated higher accuracy for when information in this experiment, he actually performed the
smallest number of trials on the nonsymbolic (N = 2,591) and symbolic DMTS tasks (N = 1,645)
compared to other monkeys. In addition, he completed a larger number of identity and spatial
DMTS trials than temporal DMTS trials. These results suggest that there may be individual
differences in the extent to which a monkey attends to the temporal component of the event, as
well as which components are most salient to the individual.
These results suggest that rhesus monkeys and human participants are able to report
multiple components from the same event. However, it is possible that this task can be
accomplished by simply selecting the most recent or familiar stimulus (and not a specific past
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episode). In the next experiment, rhesus monkeys and human participants were prevented from
using familiarity cues in responding, as they were required to select the most recent stimulus on
half of the trials and the less familiar stimulus on half of the trials, and this was randomly
determined on each trial, so that the individual did not know which question they would be asked
about until they were given the cue.
EXPERIMENT 4
The purpose of Experiment 3 described above was to: 1) determine whether rhesus
monkeys and adult humans are capable of using temporal symbols to “comment” about the
length of time that has elapsed since an event, 2) determine whether temporal knowledge of the
amount of time that has elapsed is integrated with spatial information concerning the location of
the event and the properties of the event itself and 3) compare the results of rhesus monkeys and
adult humans. However, knowing whether a short delay (1 s) or a long delay (10 s) has elapsed
since an event does not provide evidence that an individual understands when the event occurred
relative to other events in the past. In addition, it does not demonstrate that the individual is
responding to particular past event, as the individual could be responding to just the most recent
event. The purpose of Experiment 4 was to determine whether rhesus monkeys use the temporal
symbols to comment on which events are relatively “recent” compared to events that are
“remote,” and to compare the monkeys’ performance with the results from adult human
participants. Specifically, in this task I examined whether the identity of these symbols (purple
triangle and black circle) were indeed associated with the correct temporal properties, and
whether subjects were able to use these symbols to comment on the relative temporal properties
of past events.
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Method
Participants

The same rhesus monkeys and human participants that participated in the

previous experiments also participated in this experiment. Therefore, all of the participants had
experience with each of the previous tasks.
Procedure

In contrast to the previous experiment in which only one event was

presented, two different events were presented sequentially on the computer in this experiment.
One event will be referred to as the remote event and one event will be referred to as the recent
event. Each event was unique, occurring at a particular point in time (the temporal component)
and containing a separate randomly selected photo (the what component) and location (the where
component). The interval between the first event and the questioning phase (10 s) and the
second event and the questioning phase (1 s) was consistent with monkeys’ previous training
with the temporal symbols. On each trial, one of the events was randomly selected as the “test
event,” so that the individual would not be able to anticipate which event they would be asked to
report. The presentation of the events was followed by the presentation of a cue from one of the
events (an object cue, a spatial cue, or a temporal cue) to indicate which event the individual
must report. In the case of the object cue, the subject was be presented with a photo from the test
event (the what cue), followed by the where and when questions The subject was reinforced for
selecting the spatial location where the photo was presented and the temporal symbol
corresponding to when the photo was presented. In the case of the spatial cue, the subject was
presented with the spatial location from the test event (the where cue), followed by the what and
when questions. The subject was reinforced for selecting the object presented in this spatial
location and the temporal symbol corresponding to when the event took place in this spatial
location. In the case of the temporal cue, the subject was presented with the temporal symbol
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corresponding to the test event (the when cue), followed by the what and where questions. In
this task, the subject was required to indicate what and where information about the recent or
remote event (see Figure 5.1).

Memory for the Relative Order of Past Events
Event 1

Event 2

Delay
(10-s)

Randomly Selected Cue =
Temporal Cue
Object Question

Figure 5.1

Spatial Question

Memory for the Relative Order of Past Events

It is important to note that the event that the subjects were tested on was randomly
determined on each trial and therefore the subject could not anticipate whether they would be
required to report information from the most recent event or the remote event. Therefore, this
task required reference to a particular past event among other past events, and accuracy on this
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task could not be accomplished by adopting a simple rule such as “always select the most
familiar item” or “respond to the item and location that has the strongest memory trace.” In trials
in which the remote event was selected as the to-be-remembered event, responding to the most
recent location and photo would lead to decreased accuracy.
Hypotheses

It was predicted that the rhesus monkeys and human participants would be

able to use all three memory cues to report the appropriate event. However, it was expected that:
1) human participants in the control condition would perform better than participants in the
articulatory suppression condition, and 2) the temporal cue would have the highest accuracy in
both humans and monkeys.
Results
The rhesus monkeys were presented with a training task in order to familiarize them with
attending to two sequentially presented events and then responding on the basis of a temporal,
spatial, or object cue from one of the events. In this training task, the monkeys were first trained
on the long retention interval symbol as a cue (in this case the monkey was to select the photo
and spatial location of the first event that was presented). In the last 100 trials, two monkeys
were above chance at selecting the photo from the first event, p < .001, but none of the monkeys
reached above chance performance for reporting the spatial component from the first event, p >
.05. Next, the monkeys were trained on the short retention interval symbol as a cue (in this case
the monkey was to select the photo and spatial location of the second event that was presented).
In the last 100 trials, the same two monkeys were above chance at selecting the photo from the
second event, p < .001, but once again none of the monkeys were above chance at selecting the
spatial component from the second event, p < .001 (see Table 5.1).
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Table 5.1 The rhesus monkeys’ accuracy on the memory cue training tasks.
All Trials
Trials Where
Long Temporal Cue
Gale
Murph
Willie
Chewie

6779
3452
2963
1731

50%
53%
52%
53%

What
70% *
58%
46%
45%

First 100 Trials
Where
47%
62% *
47%
55%

Last 100 Trials

What

Where

40%
41%
43%
39%

47%
51%
58%
56%

What
78% *
73% *
48%
48%

Short Temporal Cue
Gale
Murph
Willie
Chewie

N
Where
6882
51%
1918
47%
1660
59%
1038
49%

What
52%
50%
49%
53%

Where
What
67% * 34%
43%
33%
51%
49%
37%
49%

Where
What
44%
83% *
47%
85% *
67% * 56%
56%
56%

Note: An asterisk indicates above chance performance, as analyzed by a binomial test, p < .01

Temporal Cue Task

In this task the monkeys were required to select the appropriate

photo and spatial location corresponding to the randomly chosen temporal cue on each trial.
There was evidence that one monkey, Murph, was able to report both the what and where
components corresponding to the temporal cue, at levels significantly above chance, as
determined by a binomial test, p < .001. Two other monkeys were significantly above chance
for one type of component, but not both. Specifically, Gale was significantly above chance at
reporting the what component and Willie was significantly above chance at reporting the where
component, as analyzed by a binomial test, p < .001 (see Table 5.2). The human participants in
both the control and aritculatory suppression group were significantly above chance at indicating
both what and where information corresponding to the temporal cue, as analyzed by a binomial
test, p < .001 (see Table 5.2). There were no significant group differences in accuracy for where

51
information [χ2(1, N = 800) = 2.13, p > .05] or what information, [χ2(1, N = 800) = 0.05, p >
.05].
Table 5.2 Accuracy for the temporal, object, and spatial cue tasks.
First Event
Where

Temporal
Monkeys
Gale
Murph
Willie
Chewie

6973
2720
3558
1164

What

51%
49%
75% * 41%
45%
51%
53%
49%

Second Event
Where

What

49%
72% *
85% * 79% *
66% * 50%
50%
53%

Humans
Control
AS

400 95% * 97% * 95% * 98% *
400 92% * 97% * 93% * 98% *
Where

Object
Monkeys
Gale
Murph
Willie
Chewie

2943
3058
3793
1138

50%
48%
52%
48%

When

Where

When

44%
52%
59% *
67% * 71% * 46%
39%
51%
62% *
53%
47%
53%

Humans
Control
AS

400 94% * 93% * 97% * 95% *
400 99% * 97% * 97% * 99% *
What

Spatial
Monkeys
Gale
Murph
Willie
Chewie

1805
2418
2154
1208

54%
52%
51%
42%

When

What

When

54% * 49%
45%
61% * 53%
37%
46%
55% * 52%
59% * 62% * 40%

Humans
Control
AS

400 94% * 94% * 92% * 88% *
400 95% * 94% * 99% * 96% *

Note: An asterisk indicates above chance performance, as analyzed by a binomial test, p < .01

However, when accuracy is analyzed as a function of trial type, comparing performance
for short retention interval trials and long retention interval trials, the results indicate that, in
general, monkeys were not equally accurate for both trial types. The monkeys that had been
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above chance at indicating what or where information were actually only above chance when the
cue prompted them to report information from the most recent event. However, there was one
exception; Murph was equally accurate at indicating spatial information on both trial types. In
contrast to the rhesus monkeys, the human participants were above chance at reporting both
types of information on trials in which they had to select the location and photo from the first
event (long retention interval cue) and trials in which they had to select the location and photo
from the second event (short retention interval cue).
Object Cue Task

The rhesus monkeys performed at chance levels, with the exception

of Murph who was significantly above chance at reporting where information and when
information, as determined by a binomial test, p < .001 (see Table 5.2). An analysis of
performance by trial type (comparing trials in which the object cue was from the first event and
trials in which the object cue was from the second event) revealed that Murph was only above
chance at reporting where information when he was required to select the location from the most
recent event, p < .001. It was also found that Murph was only above chance at reporting when
information if he was presented with the object cue from the first event (the less familiar event),
p < .001.
In contrast to the rhesus monkeys, human participants in both conditions were
significantly above chance at reporting where information and when information from the event
corresponding to the object cue, as determined by a binomial test, p < .001 (see Table 5.2).
There was a significant difference in group performance for where information, χ2(1, N = 800) =
4.99 p <.05, and when information χ2(1, N = 800) = 7.55, p < .01. Specifically, participants in
the articulatory suppression condition performed significantly better than participants in the
control condition. The human participants in both conditions were above chance at reporting
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both types of information on trials in which they had to select the location and photo from the
first event (long retention interval cue) and trials in which they had to select the location and
photo from the second event (short retention interval cue).
Spatial Cue Task

An analysis of all trials completed revealed that the rhesus monkeys

performed at chance levels, with the exception of Murph and Willie who were significantly
above chance at reporting what information corresponding to the spatial cue (see Table 5.2).
However, their accuracy was relatively low (53%) and was only significantly above chance due
to the large number of trials that they completed. An analysis of the last 100 trials completed (a
more stringent test of significance) revealed that they were not above chance. (In all of the
results described thus far, the monkeys who were significantly above chance on all trials
completed had also met the stringent criteria of being correct on the last 100 trials completed.)
In contrast to the rhesus monkeys, human participants in both conditions were
significantly above chance at reporting what information and when information from the event
corresponding to the spatial cue, as determined by a binomial test, p < .001 (see Table 5.2).
There was a significant difference in group performance for what information, χ2(1, N = 800) =
5.16, p <.05, and when information χ2(1, N = 800) = 3.89, p < .05. Specifically, participants in
the articulatory suppression condition performed significantly better than participants in the
control condition. The human participants in both conditions were equally accurate when the
spatial cue prompted them to report information from the first event and when the spatial cue
prompted them to report information from the second event.
Discussion
The rhesus monkeys were not able to use the spatial and object cues to report information
from the corresponding event, and there was only minimal evidence that they were able to use
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the temporal cue appropriately for both short and long delay trials (only for one monkey and one
question type). The monkeys were able to learn to select the photo that was seen most recently
or the photo that was less familiar in the training tasks, but when the temporal symbol was
randomly chosen on each trial, performance in general deteriorated, with the exception of one
monkey who was able to use the temporal symbols appropriately to report spatial information.

Table 5.3 The hypotheses and results from each experiment.
Experiment

Hypotheses

Monkeys

Humans

Experiment 1

Independent evidence of object, spatial, and temporal memory
Accuracy for short retention intervals > long retention intervals
Accuracy for control condition > articulatory suppression

Yes
No
-----------

Yes
No
No

Experiment 2

Memory for what and where information (1 s, 5 s, 10 s, 20 s)
General trend of accuracy decreasing as retention interval increases

Yes
Some

Not Tested
Not Tested

Experiment 3

Reporting all three components (what, where, and when)
Integration of what-where-when in working memory

Yes
Some

Yes
No

Unanticipated question type (randomly selected)
Memory for what & where > memory for when

Yes
Some

Yes
No

Accuracy for short retention intervals > long retention intervals
Accuracy for control condition > articulatory suppression

No
-----------

No
No

Use of a temporal cue to report recent or remote event
Use of an object cue to report recent or remote event
Use of a spatial cue to report recent or remote event

Some
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Accuracy for control condition > articulatory suppression

-----------

No

Experiment 4

The human participants were able to use all three types of cues appropriately. The
participants in the control condition did not perform better than participants in the articulatory
suppression condition, as originally predicted. In fact, it appeared that participants in the
articulatory suppression condition performed slightly better than participants in the control
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condition, suggesting that the articulatory suppression task actually facilitated performance. It is
possible that the articulatory suppression task may have actually made participants more aware
of rehearsal strategies, and they may have compensated for their inability to verbally rehearse by
using other nonverbal rehearsal strategies. In order to summarize the hypotheses and results
from all of the experiments, including the present experiment, the specific predictions from each
experiment and the results are presented in Table 5.3.
General Discussion
These experiments provide evidence of simultaneous memory for what, where, and when
information in a nonhuman primate species. These data complement data that have been
obtained from pigeons using a similar paradigm (Skov-Rackette et al., 2005) and suggest that the
paradigm is well suited to investigating memory in a variety of nonhuman species. In contrast to
the pigeons that did not demonstrate integration of what, where, and when information in
memory, three of the rhesus monkeys did show evidence of integration of these components in
memory. It is important to note that the high level of accuracy in both the monkeys and humans
may have obscured additional evidence of integration. It is possible that future research using
more difficult memory tasks would reveal even more evidence of integration.
In much of the previous research with nonhuman primates (Schwartz et al., 2005;
Menzel, 1999; Hampton et al., 2005), the focus has been on the long-term memory component of
episodic memory and not specifically the integration of what-where-when components in
memory. The present set of experiments provides the first systematic analysis of what-wherewhen integration in nonhuman primates. Although it is true that episodic memories are often
retrieved from long-term memory, it has been argued that they are typically encoded first in
working memory, through the use of an episodic buffer that temporarily binds information
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together before it is transferred to long-term memory (Baddeley, 2000). Therefore, it seems that
whether they are retrieved from working memory or long-term memory, the essential element
that makes episodic memories distinct is the integration of multiple components to represent a
past event in memory.
In contrast to the study that examined what-where-when memory in rhesus monkeys and
did not find memory for temporal information (Hampton et al., 2005), these findings suggest that
rhesus monkeys can report information about the temporal properties of an event. However, it is
important to note that the Hampton et al. (2005) study used long retention intervals and a
modified food-caching task, both of which may explain why the results were different than the
findings of the present experiments. However, the present study does provide evidence that
nonhuman primates can use temporal symbols to report on temporal properties of an event.
Although the symbols represented discrete temporal intervals (1 s and 10 s) the monkeys often
had to use these symbols to comment on past events after completing intervening tasks, which
most likely required them to have an understanding that the temporal symbols represented
relative temporal intervals (short vs. long) and not discrete intervals. In addition, evidence from
the sequential training tasks suggests that some monkeys were able to use the temporal symbols
as cues to report information from a recent event or remote event, which suggests that monkeys
may have some understanding that the symbols referred to relative temporal discriminations.
In the nonhuman primate literature, there has not been any evidence to indicate that
monkeys or apes can communicate about past events using temporal symbols. For example,
even language-trained chimpanzees that have an extensive vocabulary of lexigrams (symbols
that represent foods, people, locations, and activities) do not use the lexigrams for yesterday and
today in their daily interactions to comment about past events. In future research, this paradigm
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can be extended to examine memory for relative temporal durations in rhesus monkeys and
chimpanzees.
It is not surprising that human participants performed at generally higher levels than the
rhesus monkeys in all of the experiments (see Table 6.1 for list of predictions and results from
each experiment). The human participants received verbal instructions to ensure that they would
understand the task. If instructions had not been provided the human participants would have
likely been less accurate on all of the tasks than the rhesus monkeys due to the large number of
trials the rhesus monkeys had completed to learn the tasks. However, in contrast to the
prediction that the articulatory suppression task would decrease accuracy, for the most part it had
no effect, and in some cases the articulatory suppression task actually facilitated performance,
suggesting that participants may have been using some form of nonverbal rehearsal to
compensate. It is possible that engaging in the suppression task made participants more aware of
potential rehearsal strategies.
On the surface, these results would seem to suggest a species difference between rhesus
monkeys and human participants because humans generally performed better than rhesus
monkeys even when they were prevented from using verbal rehearsal strategies.
However, this conclusion would be based on the assumption that the articulatory suppression
actually did prevent rehearsal, but the fact that the articulatory suppression condition performed
better than the control condition in the last experiment suggests that the group was using some
form of nonverbal rehearsal strategy. Taken together with the fact that human participants were
given verbal instructions in response to early pilot testing, I would argue that it is difficult to
determine whether these differences are due to a species difference in memory. I speculate that
the human participants in the articulatory suppression condition may have engaged in some other
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form of nonverbal rehearsal in order to compensate for the verbal task they were engaged in. In
future research, this could be explored by examining what-where-when memory as participants
complete concurrent visual tasks and concurrent verbal tasks and compare the accuracy of the
two groups.
The results were somewhat consistent with the prediction that the length of retention
interval and information type (what, where, or when) would affect accuracy in both rhesus
monkeys and human participants. Specifically, it was predicted that accuracy would be higher
on short retention interval trials than long retention interval trials, and that accuracy for what and
where information would be higher than accuracy for when information. The length of retention
interval did affect accuracy to some extent for the rhesus monkeys, but not for the human
participants. In addition, it was not always the case that accuracy for short retention interval
trials was higher than accuracy for long retention interval trials. In fact, monkeys were more
accurate at reporting temporal information after long retention intervals than short retention
intervals. It is possible that the long delay between the presentation and test was aversive to the
monkey, and the human literature demonstrates that particularly emotional events (positive or
negative) tend to be more salient.
Although the literature suggests that memory for when an event occurred is a less salient
cue than what occurred or where it occurred, these experiments suggest that there are individual
differences in the salience of the temporal properties of an event. Specifically, the type of
information to be reported (what, where, or when) affected accuracy for the rhesus monkeys, but
there were individual differences in which types of information were more difficult. There was
some support for the prediction that when information would be more difficult to recall (two
monkeys demonstrated this pattern). However, the fact that one monkey was most accurate at
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reporting when information and that this difference could not be readily explained by the
individual’s training history, suggests that there are individual differences in the salience of the
temporal properties of past events. It is also important to note that the temporal cue may have
been more salient for this individual because the delays were relatively short compared to delays
that have been studied in the human literature (autobiographical memory for events). Therefore,
more research is needed to determine whether individual differences in temporal memory remain
when longer temporal discriminations are used.
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of this study. Although the rhesus monkeys
and human participants demonstrated memory for what, where, and when information, the
retention intervals used in this study were not long-term memory delays, but working memory
delays. In order to be considered episodic memory, it has been argued that information must be
retrieved from long-term memory (Tulving, 1993). Information may be temporarily integrated in
working memory, through the use of an episodic buffer (Baddeley, 2000) before being
transferred to long-term memory, but true episodic memory, as defined in the human literature
refers to memories that are retrieved after relatively long delays. Therefore, an ideal test of
episodic memory would examine both integration and the long-term memory component of
episodic memories. In future research, modifications of this paradigm that have been used
successfully using working memory delays can be extended to examine memory for multiple
components of events after long-term memory retention intervals.
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